Core elements (a la Aubin) of a fuzzy game can be associated with additive separable supporting functions of fuzzy games. Generalized cores whose elements consist of more general separable supporting functions of the game are introduced and studied. While the Aubin core of unanimity games can be empty, the generalized core of unanimity games is nonempty. Properties of the generalized cores and their relations to stable sets are studied. For convex fuzzy games interesting properties are found such as the fact that the generalized core is a unique generalized stable set.
G e n e r a l i z e d G e n e r a l i z e d G e n e r a l i z e d G e n e r a l i z e d cores cores cores cores a n d a n d a n d a n d stable stable stable stable sets sets sets sets f o r f o r f o r f o r f u z z y f u z z y f u z z y f u z z y games games games games SCIENCE AND AND AND  AND  TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY  TECHNOLOGY  TOKYO TOKYO TOKYO  TOKYO INSTITUTE INSTITUTE INSTITUTE  INSTITUTE OF OF OF  OF TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY  TECHNOLOGY 
Introduction
The class of cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions is introduced in Aubin (1974 Aubin ( , 1981 together with his solution concept of core. Aubin (1974) puts a linearity condition on imputations of a fuzzy game to be in the core, i.e., in a core imputation, a payoff to each player is assumed to be proportional to his/her participation level. The Aubin core turns out to be non-empty (and even large) for interesting classes of games such as the class of convex fuzzy games (cf. Branzei et al.(2003) ) and the class of fuzzy clan games (cf. Tijs et al.(2002a) ). Also the fuzzy games arising from totally balanced crisp games (Shapley and Shubik (1975) pp.231-232) have a non-empty Aubin core containing the core of the related totally balanced crisp game.
However, the situation is different for the interesting class of unanimity games, whose characteristic function assigns 1 to only fuzzy coalitions that is grater than the carrier of the game. In Branzei et al. (2003) it is proved that the Aubin core of an unanimity game is non-empty if and only if at least one player cooperate with full participation level at the carrier of this game.
We consider this as an undesirable situation and we propose in Section 4 extensions of the Aubin core based on families of separable supporting functions for a fuzzy game. In at least one of the extensions all unanimity games have a non-empty (generalized) core. Further in another extension, its (generalized) core is nonempty if and only if its corresponding crisp game has a nonempty core.
The main purpose of this paper is to study properties of generalized cores and stable sets for arbitrary fuzzy games; this is done in Section 5. Further, in Section 6 we study relations existing among different kinds of generalized cores in convex games, and prove that the generalized dominance core of is the unique generalized stable set.
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a nonempty set of players considering possibilities of cooperation. Formally, a fuzzy coalition of player set N is a vector s in [0, 1] N , where the i-th coordinate s i is referred to as the participation level of player i. The empty coalition in a fuzzy setting is e ∅ = (0, ..., 0), and e S , with S ∈ 2 N , denotes a crisp-like coalition. We call e S a crisp-like coalition because it corresponds to the situation where the players within S fully cooperate (i.e., they have participation level 1) and the players outside S are not involved at all in cooperation (i.e., they have participation level 0). e N = (1, ..., 1) is called the grand coalition. We often write e i instead of e {i} . In this paper the set of fuzzy coalitions is denoted by F N . A cooperative fuzzy game with player set N is a function v : F N → R, with v(e ∅ ) = 0, assigning to each fuzzy coalition s the value achieved by cooperation. For simplifying discussions without losing essential ideas, we assume throughout the paper that v is monotone, i.e, for any s,
Here we denote the set of monotone fuzzy games with player set N by F G N . For each v ∈ F G N , we define the function w on 2 N (set of all subsets of N) by w(S ) = v(e S ) for all S ⊆ N. We call w the crisp game corresponding to v and denote it by cr(v).
A special class of fuzzy games with a nonempty core is the class of convex fuzzy games introduced in Branzei et al.(2003) . Here v ∈ F G N is called convex if it satisfies the properties:
, where s ∨ t and s ∧ t are those elements of [0, 1] N with the i-th coordinate equal to max{s i , t i } and min{s i , t i }, respectively, for each i ∈ N.
(ii) (Coordinate-wise convexity) Take i ∈ N and s = (s 1 , . . . ,
It is proved in Branzei et al. (2003) that the Aubin core of a convex fuzzy game v coincides with the core of the corresponding crisp game w = cr (v) .
Another interesting class of fuzzy games is the class of unanimity fuzzy games. A fuzzy game v on the player set N = {1, . . . , n} is said to be a unanimity game if there exists t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ F N with t i > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n such that
The value t is called a threshold value. The unanimity game with threshold value t is denoted by u t . It is shown in Branzei et al. (2003) that the Aubin core may be empty in unanimity games.
The Aubin core and its geometric interpretation
Let v ∈ F G N and let I(v) be the imputation set of v, i.e.
The condition i∈N x i = v(e N ) is called the group rationality, and the condition x i ≥ v(e i ) for each i ∈ N is called the individual rationality. The imputation set of w = cr(v), the crisp game corresoponding to v, is given by
Thus I(v) = I(w).
The core (Aubin (1974) ) C(v) of a fuzzy game v is the subset of imputations which are stable against any possible deviation by fuzzy coalitions, i.e.
It is to be noted that each player is supposed to gain a partial payoff proportional to his/her participation level when he/she partially cooperates. 
The crisp core C cr (v) of the fuzzy game v is
Note that when defining the proper core C P (v) only the proper coalitions are taken into account in stability conditions, while for the crisp core C cr (v) we consider only crisp-like coalitions e S , with
Let x, y ∈ I(v) and let s ∈ F N . We say x dominates y via s, denoted by x dom s y,
The two conditions are interpreted as follows. In the crisp game w, for x, y ∈ I(w), we say x dominates y via S ⊆ N, denoted by x dom S y, if x i > y i for all i ∈ S and i∈S x i ≤ w(S ). We simply say x dominates y in w, denoted by x dom y in w, if there is S ⊆ N such that x dom S y. From a reason similar to the remark above, if x dom S y then S must be a proper subset of N.
The dominance core (D-core) DC(v) of a fuzzy game v is the set of imputations which are not dominated by any other imputation, i.e.
DC(v)
Similarly the dominance core DC(w) of a crisp game w is given by
A stable set of a fuzzy game v is a nonempty set K of imputations satisfying the properties:
We briefly recall the main results for cores and stable sets of a fuzzy game in Branzei et al.(2003) and Tijs et al. (2002b) , which will be extended in this paper based on some families of separable supporting functions for fuzzy games. 
Then there is a unique stable set, namely DC(v).
(7) Let v ∈ F G N be a unanimity game. Then its core may be empty. Now let us look with a geometrical eye to the Aubin core. Note first that to each x ∈ R N one can associate in a canonical way a linear function 
Generalized imputations and cores
In the following we will consider also non-linear functions p :
The function p is a payment scheme in case of partial cooperation. That is, if a player gains x i in case of full cooperation, then he/she gains p(s i )x i when his/her participation level is s i . Given such payoff scheme p, the core based on p, called p-core henceforth, is given by
The Aubin core is a special case of p-core where p is given by p(s i ) = s i . While the Aubin core assumes only a payment proportional to player's participation level, the p-core allows much wider payment schemes for partial participation.
The following example may help better understanding of the p-core. Suppose full participation is to work for thirty days and a total reward is $3,000. The Aubin core assumes a portion of $3,000 is paid in proportion to the participation level. A typical example is a daily wage, paying $100 every day. Other payment schemes are, however, observed in our world. For example, a full amount $3,000 is paid in the beginning, or half amount is paid in the beginning and the rest is paid after a worker completes the job, or a full amount is paid after a worker completes the job, and so on ‡ . This is the reason why we study general payment rules in this paper.
The two extreme payment rules, that is, the one which gives a whole amount to a player when he/she starts participation, and the other which gives a whole amount after he/she fully cooperates, are denoted by p + and p − , respectively. That is,
In an obvious way one can define the proper p-core, i.e.,
and the crisp p-core, i.e.,
Since p(1) = 1, the crisp p-core is the same as the crisp core C cr (v).
Remark 2. It is easily noticed that
For the p-core and the proper p-core, the following properties hold. (2) . To show the reverse inclusion, take any x ∈ C cr (v). Then i∈N x i = v(e N ) and i∈S x i ≥ v(e S ) for all S ⊆ N. Take any s ∈ F N . It suffices to show that i∈car(p
The last inequality follows from the monotonicity of v.
Furthermore though as shown in Branzei et al.(2003) the Aubin core may be empty in unanimity games, the p-core is nonempty when p = p + . In fact, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let u t be a unanimity game on the player set N
= {1, . . . , n}. Then C p + (u t ) ∅.
Proof. Recall p
+ is given by
Take x ∈ I(u t ). That is, x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R N where n i=1 x i = u t (e N ) = 1 and x i ≥ u t (e i ) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n. Then for p + , x is in C p + (u t ). In fact, take any fuzzy coalition s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ F. Then if s i > t i for all i = 1, . . . , n, then u t (s) = 1. From the definition of p + , we have p(s i ) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n since s i ≥ t i for all i = 1, . . . , n and t i > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Hence
Remark 3.
There exist various p ∈ P other than p + satisfying C p (u t ) ∅. An example is p ∈ P given by
where t * = min(t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ). In a similar manner to the proof above, one may show that C p (u t ) is not empty.
Generalized dominance core and stable sets
First we define generalized domination relations. Take a fuzzy game v ∈ F G N on N = {1, . . . , n}, and a function p ∈ P. For two imputations x, y ∈ I(v) and a fuzzy coalition s = (s 1 , . . . , s n 
(ii) (p-external stability) For all z ∈ I(v)\K p , there is an imputation x ∈ K p such that x dom p z.
Then trivially we have the extension of Theorem 1 (ii) and (iii) in Tijs et al. (2002b)

Theorem 3. Take a fuzzy game v ∈ F G
N on player set N = {1, . . . , n} and p ∈ P. Then 
(3) x dom p + y in v if and only if x dom y in w = cr(v). Thus DC p + (v) = DC(w) and K is a stable set in v under p − if and only if K is a stable set in w.
Proof. (1)The theorem is trivially true if DC p (v) = I(v). So, suppose DC p (v) ⊂ I(v). Let x ∈ I(v)\DC p (v). Then there are y ∈ I(v) and s ∈ PF N satisfying p(s i )y i > p(s i )x i for each i ∈ car(p(s)) and i∈car(p(s)) p(s i )y i ≤ v(s). Then
i∈car(p(s)) p i (s i )x i < i∈car(p(s)) p(s i )y i ≤ v(s). Hence p ∈ I(v)\C P p (v). We conclude that C P p (v) ⊂ DC p (v). (2) Let K p be aP p (v) implies x DC p (v). If I(v) = C P p (v), then we easily have C P p (v) = DC p (v) since C P p (v) ⊆ DC p (v) ⊆ I(v). We assume that C P p (v) ⊂ I(v) and take x ∈ I(v)\C P p (v). Then there is s ∈ PF N such that i∈car(p(s)) p(s i )x i < v(s). Then i∈car(p(s)) p * (s)x i < v(s), and thus i∈car(p(s)) x i < v * p (s). Hence for each i ∈ car(p(s)), we can take i > 0 such that i∈car(p(s)) (x i + i ) < v * p (s) and i∈car(p(s)) p(s i )(x i + i ) < v(s). Define y ∈ R N by y i =        x i + i if i ∈ car(p(s)), v(e i ) + v(e N )−v * p (s)− j∈N\car(p(s)) v(e j ) |N\car(p(s))| + δ i if i ∈ N\car(p(s))where δ i , i ∈ N\car(p(s)), are positive reals such that i∈N y i = v(e N ). Since i∈car(p(s)) (x i + i ) < v * p (s), we can take such δ i , i ∈ N\car(p(s)). Note that y i > x i ≥ v(e i ) for each i ∈ car(p(s)). Furthermore since v(e N ) − v * p (s) − i∈\car(p(s)) v(e i ) ≥ 0, we have y i > v(e i )
for each i ∈ N\car(p(s)). Hence y ∈ I(v). Now since y i > x i for all i ∈ car(p(s)), p(s i )y i > p(s i )x i for all i ∈ car(p(s)). Moreover i∈car(p(s)) p(s i )y i < v(s), and thus y dom p x. Hence we obtain x ∈ I(v)\DC p (v).
It is known that in crisp games if the core and the dominance core do not coincide then the core must be empty. The following example, however, shows that there may exist a nonempty proper p-core which is a proper subset of pdominance core. We also describe a unique stable set that is equal to the pdominance core.
Then the imputation set is
The proper p-core is given by s 2 , 0) . (1) s 1 = s 2 = 1:
3 ≥ 0, the last inequality is most critical and only the imputation (0, 2, 0) clears this inequality. Thus
With respect to DC p (v), we first notice the following. For each y ∈ I(v), there exist x ∈ I(v) such that x dom p y if and only if y 1 + y 2 < 2. To show the if-part, suppose y 1 + y 2 < 2. Let = 2 − (y 1 + y 2 ) > 0, and define x by x 1 = y 1 + /2, x 2 = y 2 + /2 and x 3 = 0. Then x ∈ I(v) since x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ≥ 0 and v(3/4, 3/4, 0) . Therefore it follows that
. Finally we notice that from the proof of the if-part above, DC p (v) is itself a stable set.
Generalized cores and stable sets for convex fuzzy games
In this section, we study properties of p-cores, dominance p-cores and p-stable sets in convex games. Throughout this section we focus on the case where the function p ∈ P is concave. The function p :
It should be noted further that if p ∈ P C then p ∈ P + , i.e., p(a) > 0 for all a ∈ (0, 1]. In fact, if the conclusion is false, then there exists a * ∈ (0, 1] with p(a * ) = 0. Then from the concavity of p, we have 0 = p(a
Since a * > 0, a contradiction follows. First we pick up a p-core. Let Π be a set of linear orders of N. For each fuzzy game v ∈ F G N and each σ ∈ Π, define m 
Here conv{m σ (v)|σ ∈ Π} is a convex hull of n! points m σ (v), σ ∈ Π. As shown in Theorem 1 C p (v) ⊆ C cr (v) holds in general. When v is convex and p is concave, these two sets coincide.
Theorem 5. Let v ∈ F G
N is convex and p ∈ P C . Then C p (v) = C cr (v).
Proof. From Theorem 1 we have C p (v) ⊆ C cr (v) . To show the reverse inclusion, it suffices to show that for each
Here the fast inequality follows from the convexity (more precisely, coordinatewise convexity) of v. In fact, since v is coordinate-wise convex, for each k = 1, . . . , n,
The second inequality follows from the monotonicity of v and the fact that the concavity of p induces
Hence
From Theorem 1, the following corollary holds.
We next pick up p-dominance cores and p-stable sets. In section 5, we showed that in case of the function p + , dominance relation in any fuzzy game v is preserved in the corresponding crisp game w = cr(v). That is, for any x, y ∈ I(v) = I(w), x dom p + y in v if and only if x dom y in w. In the following, we will show that the same preservation holds in convex games if the function p is concave. We first show a lemma. 
Lemma 1. Let v ∈ F G
= s + (1 − sī)e¯i. Then s = (1 − sī)q + sīr. Note that φ(q) = − 1, φ(r) = − 1, |car(p(q))| = |car(p(s))| − 1 and |car(p(r))| = |car(p(s))|. The inequality i∈car(p(s)) p(s i )x i ≤ v(s) implies i∈car(p(s)) p((1− sī)q i + sīr i )x i ≤ v(s). The concavity of p shows that i∈car(p(s)) p((1 − sī)q i + sīr i )x i ≥ i∈car(p(s)) ((1 − sī)p(q i )x i + sī p(r i )x i ).
